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In this paper we argue that Argentina, Brazil and Mexico must focus 
economic and social policies on creating employment if they want to 
provide decent work (i.e. formal jobs with social security coverage). 
During the 1990s, financial and trade liberalization and the associated 
laissez-faire policies did not deliver in terms of growth or employment 
in the countries under consideration. We assess the macroeconomic, 
trade, investment and labour-market policies of the countries during 
1990-2004 and then propose a series of recommendations that give 
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Argentina, Brazil and Mexico face many employment 
challenges. New job growth since 1990 has been 
insufficient to cope with the increase in labour supply. 
Despite the recent economic and job upswing, a 
comparison between 1990 and 2004 reveals lower 
employment rates in Argentina and Brazil; a higher 
proportion of workers employed in the informal 
sector in Brazil and Mexico; only marginal increases 
in average real manufacturing wages in Brazil and 
Mexico, with a decline in Argentina; while wage and 
income inequality remained high in all three countries 
and worsened noticeably in Argentina. Also, social 
security covers less than half of salaried workers in 
Argentina, and two-thirds in Brazil and Mexico. The 
lack of job growth (particularly of formal jobs with 
social protection) and, in certain cases, labour-market 
deterioration have been the greatest disappointments of 
the new development strategy adopted by the countries 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, given that 
the new strategy had no explicit employment goal 
—rather it merely assumed that the liberalization of 
capital, goods and labour markets would bring about 
job creation—the poor employment performance is 
not surprising. 
Thus the challenge of creating employment 
remains for all three countries. In this paper, we 
attempt to answer the following question: if the 
creation of quality employment were the central 
goal of government policy in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, what economic and social policies would be 
needed? Macroeconomic policies, trade and investment 
policies, and labour-market regulations and policies are 
fundamental for the creation of good quality jobs. This 
article discusses why these policies did not bring about 
quality employment creation during 1990-2004 and 
how they can be redesigned to promote employment. 
 This article is a synopsis of the findings from the book Meeting 
the Employment Challenge: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the 
Global Economy (Berg, Ernst and Auer, 2006). The authors would 
like to thank Adriana Marshall for her contribution to the section on 
labour-market regulations and policies. They are also grateful to an 
anonymous referee for helpful comments, as well as to participants 
at seminars in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Geneva in 2004 and 
2005, for their valuable insights. The views expressed in this paper 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
International Labour Organization. The authors are also responsible 





Economic growth usually leads to employment creation, 
but growth alone is not always sufficient, as job creation 
also depends on the labour intensity of economic 
growth. Although economic growth can spur investment 
—thereby improving productivity and, ultimately, the 
level of income in an economy— the best means 
of achieving higher economic growth is a matter of 
debate among economists. Beginning two decades 
ago, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico radically changed 
their macroeconomic policies in an effort to control 
inflation and reap the benefits of increased integration 
with the world economy. Since then, economic growth 
has been volatile and relatively low, affecting the ability 
of these economies to create employment, particularly 
in the formal sector. 
During 1990-2004, growth averaged 3.2% in 
Argentina, 2.5% in Brazil and 3% in Mexico. By 
historical standards, economic growth during this 
period compares unfavourably with the 1960s and 
1970s (particularly in Brazil and Mexico), when growth 
was near double digits. In Argentina, between 1990 
and 2004, the standard deviation of economic growth 
was 6.5%, more than double the average growth rate. 
In Brazil and Mexico, economic growth was also 
volatile, though much less so than Argentina, with 
standard deviations comparable to the growth rates 
(See figure 1).
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The relatively poor performance of these economies 
was associated with a sharp shift in macroeconomic 
policy. The volatile economic experiences of the three 
countries are marked by two different six-year spans: 
economic opening in 1985-1991 and the economic 
crashes of 1995-2001. During the pre-crash period, 
all three countries maintained a fixed exchange rate 
that resulted in a loss of export competitiveness and 
a negative trade balance. The countries had to rely 
on capital inflows to finance the imbalance, but these 
inflows and the resulting expansion in domestic credit 
were primarily directed towards consumption of 
imported goods. Moreover, exchange-rate appreciation 
aggravated the difficulties faced by the previously 
protected domestic industries in adjusting to the new 
competitive environment. The labour market bore the 
brunt of adjustment, as the declining competitiveness 
of domestic firms led to lay-offs and wage cuts. 
In the post-crash period, the countries regained 
their competitiveness as exchange rates are now 
flexible, but the high debt-to-GDP levels and fears of 
renewed inflation have meant that monetary and fiscal 
policy remain restrictive. Price stability continues 
to be the central concern of macroeconomic policy, 
embodied in the current policy of inflation targeting. 
The other principal objective is debt sustainability. The 
restrictive bias in macroeconomic policy, particularly in 
Brazil and Mexico, has hurt employment creation. High 
interest rates have lessened domestic investment, while 
shrunken public resources have meant less spending 
on public and social infrastructure. The countries 
continue to maintain their capital accounts open, 
limiting macroeconomic policy to either controlling 
the exchange rate or the interest rate. In addition, 
although the exchange rate is no longer fixed, there are 
limits to its flexibility since the countries must guard 
against excessive currency devaluation, which can fuel 
inflation as well as increase the cost of servicing the 
debt, as much of the debt is in dollars, but national 
income is in local currency. As a result, many of the 
same macroeconomic constraints still impede the policy 
choices of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
The governments of Brazil and Mexico have 
adopted inflation targeting as their policy tool for 
controlling inflation, and Argentina is seriously 
considering following suit. Inflation targeting entails 
having the central bank pre-announce a rate of inflation 
to be met for the year and focusing central bank policy 
on achieving this goal. Employment is not a policy 
objective. Inflation-reduction measures have been 
successful in the countries under consideration. This 
success has come at a price, however, since the policies 
implemented to restrain inflation often involve raising 
interest rates, which deters investment and, as a result, 
labour demand. Furthermore, it is not clear why inflation 
targeting has become the central macroeconomic policy 
FIGURE 1
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: low and volatile GDP, 1990-2004
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1. Export orientation and its effects on quality 
employment
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico adopted new export-oriented development 
strategies that involved trade liberalization, regional 
trade agreements and the curtailment of government 
industrial policy. Trade liberalization is supposed to 
create new export opportunities and thus influence the 
export pattern of a country. Regional integration can 
complement this process by promoting trade among 
neighbouring countries. However, free trade will be 
more beneficial for a country’s development if it 
exports goods and services for which world demand 
is increasing, and if production of these goods has 
a multiplier effect on output and employment. We 
therefore analyse changes in export specialization 
as a consequence of trade liberalization and regional 
following the demise of exchange-rate anchoring, since 
there is no empirical evidence to show that an economy 
with an annual rate of inflation of around 10% performs 
worse than an economy with annual inflation of around 
3% (Islam, 2003). 
By using interest rates to control inflation, interest 
rates are higher than they need be, which has the 
adverse effect of increasing the cost of debt, the debt 
burden and, ultimately, the perception of risk. It also 
raises domestic interest rates, making it more expensive 
for domestic banks to borrow from abroad, thus 
increasing the cost of credit available domestically. The 
high interest rates in Argentina, Mexico, and especially 
Brazil, have aggravated the already difficult process 
that firms, particularly small ones, face in obtaining 
financing. In a 2000 business-environment survey, 73% 
of Argentine firms, 84% of Brazilian firms and 71% of 
Mexican firms reported high interest rates as a major 
obstacle for the operation and growth of their business 
(World Bank, 2000). 
Another feature of macroeconomic policy in 
Brazil and Mexico is the restrictiveness of f iscal 
policy. Controlling public spending is integral to 
keeping inflation in check and is also necessary for 
funding debt payments. As was the case with restrictive 
monetary policy, however, restrictive fiscal policy 
reduces aggregate demand, which in turn hampers job 
creation. Because of the large debt repayment burden, 
these countries have to run primary fiscal surpluses 
to service the debt. However, this means that the 
government is taking in more money domestically than 
it is spending, which is contractionary. Furthermore, 
fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical, which aggravates 
downturns since spending is reduced when the economy 
goes into recession. 
Mexico and, more recently, Brazil have made 
efforts to bring their budgets into balance by running 
primary surpluses to finance debt repayment. Deficit 
control is also fundamental to the governments’ 
objective of keeping inflation in check. Indeed, Mexico, 
and Brazil and Argentina would, for the most part, meet 
the fiscal criteria stipulated in the Treaty of Maastricht: a 
ceiling of 60% for the general government debt-to-GDP 
ratio, and a ceiling of 3% for the government financial 
deficit-to-GDP ratio.1 Some Brazilian economists have 
proposed lowering the fiscal surplus target so that the 
government can dedicate funds to investment projects.2 
The Brazilian government has also requested of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that spending on 
infrastructure be counted as investment rather than 
government outlays. Infrastructure projects that use 
labour-intensive production methods would have the 
added benefit of reducing unemployment in the country. 
Moreover, by fixing a primary-surplus target without 
considering economic cycles, countries run the risk of 
aggravating downturns, since there is no built-in relief 
mechanism.
III
Trade and investment policies
1 With the devaluation in late 2001, Argentina’s debt-to-GDP ratio 
jumped from 52% of GDP to 132%; it continues, however, to meet 
the public deficit criteria. With a debt-to-GDP ratio of 50%, Brazil 
meets the debt-to-GDP criteria, though it has exceeded the public 
deficit criteria several times in the 1990s, most recently in 1998 
when it ran a public deficit of 7.1% of GDP.
2 See the website of Desemprego Zero (www.desempregozero.org.
br) for a variety of articles on this topic.
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integration, and then compare the specialization to 
changes in world demand for the specific product. 
Table 1 shows that, between the periods 1985-1995 and 
1995-2000, the number of rising-star products in which 
the three countries are specialized (products whose 
import share increased in the world market) declined 
considerably from 277 to 89 for all three countries 
taken together, while the number of retreat products 
(products whose import share in the world market was 
falling) increased considerably from 109 to 246. 
TABLE 1
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: changes 
in number of products within the 
competitiveness matrix, 1985-2000a
 Argentina Brazil Mexico
 1985-1995 World 1985-1995 World 1985-1995 World
 65 99 64 71 77 106
 46 32 39 62 24 25
 1995-2000 World 1995-2000 World 1995-2000 World
 101 29 96 35 70 25
 70 35 76 29 100 26
 1995-2000 1995-2000 1995-2000
 MERCOSURb MERCOSUR NAFTAc
 64 47 73 41 68 27
 59 56 48 63 90 43
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on the ECLAC TradeCAN 
database, 2002.
a In each group of four f igures, the top left corresponds to 
falling stars; top right to rising stars; bottom left to retreats 
(not specialized, declining product) and; bottom right to missed 
opportunities (not specialized, rising product).
b Southern Common Market.
c North American Free Trade Agreement.
Generally speaking, Argentina and Brazil remain 
specialized in low value and low to medium labour-
intensive primary and semi-processed products, 
creating little employment. Brazil does, however, 
have a comparative advantage in some manufactured 
goods (such as motor vehicles, textiles), especially 
in trade with its MERCOSUR neighbours. However, 
with the exception of some successful industries, the 
MERCOSUR countries are increasingly distant from 
the most dynamic flows of international trade, such 
as high-technology products. Mexico has continued to 
deepen its specialization in manufactured goods, mainly 
thanks to its maquila industry, as 60% of its exports 
in the late 1990s were considered to be of a medium 
to high-technological level, compared to only 20% in 
the 1980s (Dussel Peters, 2003). Nevertheless, these 
industries depend heavily on imports of intermediate 
goods, which represent more than 80% of total export 
sales, and which account for most of the value added. 
The declining specialization in dynamic products vis-à-
vis the world market and the remaining specialization in 
primary or semi-processed primary products is of great 
concern, particularly in Argentina, but also in Brazil. 
Even though these exports have a positive impact on 
macroeconomic variables such as the trade balance, 
currency reserves, and, where relevant, public revenue 
from export taxes, this type of specialization alone is 
not very promising, as the goods are subject to high 
price vulnerability and create few good quality jobs.
Another consideration when analysing the 
economic and employment effects of trade liberalization 
is imports. Between 1990 and 2003, imports increased 
annually at an average rate of 17% in Argentina, 10% 
in Brazil and 24% in Mexico. What was the effect of 
this import surge on employment and wages? With 
the exception of the food industry in Mexico, most 
of the goods exposed to import competition were 
higher-value-added goods such as medical appliances, 
electronic valves or special-purpose machinery (See 
table 2). In contrast to major export sectors, which 
had a low to medium labour intensity, industries 
exposed to imports had mostly medium to high 
labour intensity and were therefore slightly more 
important for employment. However, their share in 
total manufacturing employment was not significant 
(under 1%), except in the case of special-purpose 
machinery in Argentina and food products in Mexico. 
Nevertheless, the labour-market impact of economic 
opening was mixed and strongly depended on each 
specific industry. In Mexico, the industries that were 
most exposed to import competition, as listed in table 2, 
experienced solid output growth (over 3%) and positive 
employment growth; only the processed-food sector 
recorded negative growth, while the electronic valves 
sector increased by 15%. Wage growth was negative 
but above average, except in the case of electronic 
valves (+7.0). In Argentina and Brazil, even though 
these industries displayed largely positive output and 
wage growth, employment growth was for the most 
part less favourable compared with the rest of the 
manufacturing sector. It was either negative, especially 
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in Brazil (between -2.5% and -9.0%), or lower than the 
average for manufacturing.3
The relatively good employment performance 
was partly due to the fact that by the second half 
of the 1990s (the period under consideration), many 
companies had already adjusted to the new context. 
Also, most of the sectors exposed to increased imports, 
besides food industries in Mexico and special-purpose 
machinery in Argentina, were those producing higher-
value-added goods and employing relatively few 
workers, such as medical appliances or electronic 
valves. Moreover, some imports were of consumer 
goods that were not produced domestically, thus 
having no effect on domestic production. Perhaps more 
importantly, imports of intermediate goods helped to 
improve the competitiveness of national production. 
The indirect impact of imports on employment, 
however, was rather negative. Greater competition 
in the domestic market and imports of technology 
led to industrial restructuring and to a rise in labour 
productivity in the traditional industrial sectors, 
particularly in Argentina and Brazil. The substitution 
of labour with capital resulted in a general decrease in 
demand for labour in manufacturing but also to a wage 
shift in favour of skilled workers, as was the case in 
the automobile sector of Argentina and Brazil. Another 
sector that suffered significantly from imports was the 
agricultural sector in Mexico where, between 1993 and 
2002, around one million agricultural jobs were lost due 
to cheap corn imports (National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (INEGI), 2002).
Even though trade liberalization and regional 
integration caused a strong increase in trade and led 
to better integration in the world economy, it did not 
have the expected positive impact on production, 
employment and wages during the period of analysis 
(see table 3). Contrary to conventional economic 
thinking, the dominant export sectors were more 
capital intensive than labour intensive. Moreover, there 
was a steep rise in imports in the region, but not a 
similar degree of export dynamism, particularly in 
TABLE 2
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: industries most exposed to import competition
and labour-market trends, 1995-2000a
 Rankingb Output Labour Emp. Emp. Wage
  growth intensity share growth Growth
Argentina Electronic valves, tubes, etc. 3.1 Medium 0.6 4.1 7.3
 TV, radio receivers and assoc. goods 0.4 High 0.4 -2.9 2.2
 Medical appliances 8.9 Medium 0.8 5.1 6.9
 TOTAL Manufacturing 1.7  100 3.9 4.1
Brazil Processing of nuclear fuel  -4.4 Medium 0.9 -9.0 2.0
 Electronic valves, tubes, etc. -1.5 High 0.5 -2.5 -8.2
 Medical appliances 5.7 Medium 0.8 -2.5 -0.6
 TOTAL Manufacturing 4.0  100 -0.9 -3.1
Mexico Electronic valves, tubes, etc. 14.7 Low 0.1 4.1 7.0
 Processed meat, fish, fruit, veg. -2.4 Medium 3.0 1.8 -4.1
 Special-purpose machinery 3.4 High 0.9 6.2 -1.5
 TOTAL Manufacturing 3.7  100 3.5 -4.4
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) (United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), 2006).
a The highest ranked product groups per country are shown in this table. Output growth rates are annual average values at constant market 
prices, wages are real: Argentina: 1995-1999, Brazil: 1996-1999, Mexico: 1996-1999.
b The indicator X-M/(Y-X+M) demonstrates which industry has been most exposed to import competition: it shows net imports (X-M) 
divided by domestic absorption (Y-X+M), or how much has been consumed domestically. 
3 Table 2 only shows the three sectors most exposed to imports, but 
the analysis refers to the eight sectors most exposed to imports.
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Argentina and Brazil. Exchange-rate appreciation was 
a major macroeconomic variable hampering an export 
drive. Only Mexico experienced an export surge in 
manufacturing production and employment during the 
second half of the 1990s, mainly due to the booming 
maquiladora sector. However, the maquiladora industry 
did not develop significant linkages with the rest of 
the economy and declined significantly from 2000, 
drastically reducing formal job creation in Mexico. The 
opening of the domestic market to highly subsidized 
agricultural products from the United States had 
a disastrous impact on employment in agriculture. 
This shows that the sequencing and targeting of 
economic opening are crucial for avoiding high social-
adjustment costs.
2. The evolution and nature of FDI inflows and 
their importance for the labour market
Attracting FDI has been a key aspect of the countries’ 
outward-oriented development strategy, as FDI is seen as 
compensating scarce domestic financial resources that 
are needed to help modernize and increase production, 
facilitate integration into the world market and generate 
employment. The new development strategy of the 
1990s and the increased globalization of production 
worldwide led to significantly higher FDI inflows 
between 1990 and 2003 than in the 1980s. According 
to recent data from the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI inflows 
were four times higher in Mexico, which began trade 
and financial liberalization earlier, six times higher in 
Brazil and over 10 times higher in Argentina, which 
had the most comprehensive privatization programme 
during the 1990s. 
The impact of large FDI inflows on employment, 
however, was to a large extent disappointing. This 
unfavourable outcome is mainly explained by the 
type of investment. Table 4 summarizes the type of 
foreign investment the countries have received and its 
importance for employment. 
Most foreign investment did not create new 
productive activities to spur the recruitment of 
additional workers. Quite the contrary in fact, as 
foreign direct investment was often associated with the 
restructuring of companies, implying rationalization 
measures that led to labour shedding. As a result, few 
productive assets with additional employment potential 
were created. This is apparent from the increased 
importance of mergers and acquisitions in total FDI 
flows to the three countries, with an extremely high 
share of over 80% in Argentina and a more moderate 
share of over 40% in Mexico. Table 5 also shows 
the greater importance that this form of FDI has had 
in Latin America —particularly in Argentina and 
Brazil— as compared with China and India, even 
though their share also expanded considerably in the 
period 1997-2002. 
TABLE 3
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: summary of the impact of trade 
liberalization,a 1990-2003
Trade Argentina Brazil Mexico
Tariff reduction +++ +++ ++
Export increase ++ ++ +++
Import increase +++ +++ +++
Intraregional trade increase ++ ++ +++
Specialization in dynamic exports - - -
Labour intensity of major exports ++ ++ +
Employment impact of exports -/+ -/0 +
Wage impact of exports -/+ + 0/+
Direct employment impact of increased imports -/+ -/+ -/+
Indirect employment impact of increased imports - - -/0
Source: Authors’ compilation.
a Minus sign (-) means declining effects; -/+ means mixed; + means low/positive; ++ means positive; +++ means very positive. Also, -/0 
means slightly negative effects, while 0/+ indicates slightly positive.
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TABLE 5
Average share of mergers and acquisitions 
(M & As) in FDI inflows, 1991-1996 and 
1997-2002, selected countries
(percentages)






Developing countries 17.4 34.5
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), 2000.
As a consequence of domestic-market opening and 
privatization, most foreign investment was channelled 
into services. Service FDI mainly came in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions resulting from the privatization 
of public utility companies or bank restructuring, which 
often did not create new productive assets, but rather 
tended to use existing ones. In addition, decades of 
protection led to a slack labour force, which was 
reduced during the privatization and modernization 
process of the 1990s, so that the overall impact on 
employment was minimal or even negative.
Economic liberalization led to increased 
competitiveness in the manufacturing sector, the 
second most important destination of FDI inflows. 
As in the service sector, restructuring strategies to 
increase productivity often involved rationalization 
measures and labour shedding. In addition, FDI mainly 
went into low to medium labour-intensive sectors. 
Manufacturing transnational corporations (TNCs) that 
were already present made little, if any, contribution 
to employment creation. Even though “old” capital-
intensive industries, such as automobiles and chemicals, 
were major recipients of FDI, these sectors rationalized 
production and either created few jobs or experienced a 
decline in employment in the 1990s. Nevertheless, they 
experienced a rise in productivity and competitiveness 
as well as a further export orientation of their products, 
which are promising signs for the future. This trend 
shows that maintaining targeted sectoral support by 
the public sector to this industry, even during a period 
inspired by liberal policies, was crucial and helpful 
in the restructuring process. Also, the arrival of new 
TNCs (especially in the automobile sector) resulted in 
the creation of fewer jobs. Moreover, wage increases 
in FDI-dominated manufacturing sectors were average, 
especially for skilled workers, reflecting the increases 
in labour productivity.
In Mexico, the employment situation is much 
more favourable than in Argentina and Brazil, as 
strong manufacturing FDI has generated many new 
jobs. This positive trend, however, can be mainly 
attributed to the maquiladoras, which benefited from 
strong greenfield investments in labour-intensive 
industries. The maquiladora sector also experienced 
TABLE 4
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: types of foreign investment and their dimension
and importance for employment creation, 1990-2004
Investment Importance of investment  Importance of foreign investment inflows
 for employment
 Argentina Brazil Mexico
Portfolio Insignificant Medium Medium Medium
FDI Medium High High High
Privatization Mixed High Medium Insignificant
Horizontal investment High High High Medium
Vertical investment Medium Insignificant Insignificant High
Mergers & acquisitions Mixed High High Medium
Greenfield investment High Medium Medium High
Resource-seeking Insignificant High Insignificant Insignificant
Market-seeking Medium High High High
Efficiency-seeking Medium-high Insignificant Insignificant High
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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above-average wage rises, even though their level 
still tends to be below the average in manufacturing. 
However, their comparative advantage is rather fragile, 
as evidenced by net FDI outflows since 2000 and a 
subsequent decline of formal employment. However, 
one encouraging prospect has been the creation of 
third-generation maquiladoras, based on technology-
intensive production activities carried out by highly 
skilled workers. By competing on the strength of 
quality rather than prices, firms are in a better position 
to fight off low-wage competitors. 
FDI is also meant to create forward and backward 
linkages with domestic firms. In import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) sectors, some linkages exist, 
but these were mainly formed before the 1990s. 
Moreover, strong capital and import inflows caused an 
increased substitution of national suppliers in favour of 
international suppliers, even in these sectors. Mexico 
received substantial investment in assembly plants 
located on the border with the United States, although 
this investment established few links with the rest of 
the economy.
Given the strong increase in FDI during the 1990s, 
one important question concerns the effect it had on 
domestic investment. If FDI had no effect, any increase 
would be reflected in a rise in total investment. On the 
other hand, if FDI had promoted domestic investment, 
this would have had a multiplier effect on total 
investment. This occurred in East and South East Asia 
during the 1990s, despite being the most restrictive 
region towards FDI among developing regions. 
Alternatively, FDI can crowd out domestic investment, 
meaning that increased foreign inflows hamper domestic 
investment, in which case domestic investment is simply 
replaced by foreign investment, or worse, the increase 
in total investment is smaller than the increase in FDI. 
Weeks (2000) and Agosin and Mayer (2000) show, 
that in Latin America, which undertook the most far-
reaching liberalization of FDI rules during the 1990s, 
FDI unfortunately crowded out domestic investment. 
Credit-rationing associated with monetary restraints 
aggravated the crowding-out effect.
The crowding out is apparent if we compare overall 
domestic investment to FDI. Despite the large surge of 
foreign financing in the 1990s in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, overall domestic investment did not increase. 
In Argentina, domestic investment averaged 17% of 
GDP during 1990-2001, in Brazil and Mexico it was 
slightly higher at 20% of GDP (see figure 2). In contrast, 
in East Asia during the 1970s and 1980s, investment-
FIGURE 2
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: investment as a share of GDP,
1990-2003a
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
a Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) is used as a proxy for domestic investment.
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1.  Regulatory reform
Labour law reform has been advocated vigorously by 
the Washington consensus, given the belief that, for 
economic reforms to be successful, the labour market 
must be flexible so that firms can adapt to the changing 
competitive environment. In particular, easing dismissal 
protection laws and reducing labour costs have been 
among the reforms deemed necessary for the success 
of the new economic model. Officially, the rationale 
behind these reforms was that, by facilitating flexible 
contracts and dismissals and bringing down non-wage 
labour costs, reforms would reduce non-compliance and 
precarious employment relations, as well as increasing the 
competitiveness of firms, which would in turn stimulate 
employment creation. The nature and scope of the labour 
reforms in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico was determined 
by the importance governments attached to cutting 
labour costs as a means of improving their international 
competitiveness, the influence of trade unions and other 
political actors, the pressure of employers, the pressure 
of international financial institutions in favour of the 
proposed changes, and lastly, the nature and degree of 
protection legally guaranteed to workers.
In Argentina reforms pursuing “external numerical 
flexibility” (or easing hiring and firing) and labour-cost 
reductions progressed steadily during the 1990s, though 
by the end of the decade new labour reforms were 
implemented to re-establish some of the rights that had 
been previously withdrawn. Reforms were numerous 
and far-reaching and concerned temporary contracts 
and their associated social security costs (1991, 1995, 
2000), dismissals (1991, 1998), and non-wage labour 
costs in general (1994). Despite the drastic regulatory 
changes of the 1990s, the employment regulations 
prevailing in the early part of the current decade were 
not dramatically different from those that had existed 
prior to the economic reforms of 1991. The most 
important of the surviving regulatory changes were the 
reduced dismissal compensation for workers with less 
seniority (though this was doubled in the 2002 decree), 
and the ability to hire a worker on a trial contract, but 
without the previous exemptions on social security 
payments. Also, specific, less protective regulations 
for small firms remained. Furthermore, the capacity 
to change regulations through collective bargaining 
remains in place and has the potential for a more 
drastic impact. Nevertheless, the government’s decision 
in the 1990s to make the labour market more flexible 
legally, as well as through its discourse and its decision 
to weaken labour inspection, resulted in a noticeable 
increase in the number of clandestine workers.
to-GDP ratios exceeded 30% of GDP, resulting in 
sustained high growth rates. Another drawback to the 
surge in capital inflows was that domestic investment 
was volatile and strongly correlated with FDI. This 
was especially true in Argentina, where fluctuations 
in foreign participation in investment and total 
investment-to-GDP had an astoundingly high correlation 
of 90% during 1990-2001. In Brazil and Mexico the 
relationship was strong, but not as dramatic, with 
correlations of nearly 60% in both countries. The 
strong dependence on foreign investment and the 
high level of fluctuation led to an increased external 
vulnerability of these economies. Another previously 
mentioned negative macroeconomic effect was that the 
inflows contributed to the appreciation of the exchange 
rate (despite attempts at currency sterilization) and 
a fall in competitiveness. Furthermore, foreign 
investment had the perverse effect of prolonging the 
policy of high real interest rates to sustain it. This 
limited access to credit for local firms, which constitute 
major local employers.
Rising inflows of FDI increased the countries’ 
dependency on external financing for their development, 
thus increasing their vulnerability. Another characteristic 
of FDI was the limited influence the countries had 
regarding the investment decisions of foreign companies. 
For example, FDI inflows decreased in 2000 in 
the region because of the recession in countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and not because of a deteriorating 
investment environment. While FDI is certainly crucial 
for the development of the region, integration into the 
world market and employment, domestic investment of 
local firms is also essential.
IV
Labour-market regulations and policies
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In Brazil, reforms to labour regulations were 
geared, as in Argentina, to making the employment 
contract more flexible, though the changes were 
more restricted and most reforms were introduced in 
the second half of the 1990s. The principle reforms 
include the passage of the Law of Cooperatives, which 
permitted the creation of cooperatives of workers to 
deliver services to firms without the constitution of a 
work contract, with its recognized social and labour 
rights. Also in 1994, salaries were de-indexed from 
inflation, with the introduction of free negotiation 
of wages following almost 30 years of off icial 
wage policies. In 1998, working-time “banks” were 
introduced to make working hours more flexible and 
do away with paid overtime. Part-time work contracts 
were legalized in the same year, allowing working hours 
up to 25 hours per week with lessened labour rights. In 
1998, another law instituted fixed-term contracts with 
reduced social rights.
Mexico has not reformed its labour law, though 
there have been several projects under discussion 
concerning different aspects of flexibility, such as the 
regulation of employment termination, severance pay, 
the creation of temporary and other special contracts, as 
well as regulations on subcontracting and on working 
time (de la Garza, 2002). In spite of the absence of legal 
reforms, many de facto changes have been achieved, 
particularly as a result of collective bargaining. 
Based on an analysis of collective agreements in the 
mid-1990s, de la Garza (2002) concluded that most 
of them guaranteed substantial functional flexibility 
and moderate numerical flexibility. In their study of 
manufacturing, Herrera and Melgoza (2003) found 
that de-regulation was increasing, given that many 
central issues had ceased to be formally regulated. 
For example, the proportion of firms having written, 
formal instruments (collective agreements, specific 
arrangements, internal regulations of firms) addressing 
employment contracts, use of labour and organization 
of production, had halved between 1995 and 1999. 
Nonetheless, this process was less pronounced in 
large enterprises, but rather was concentrated in 
micro, small and medium-sized firms, as well as in 
the maquiladora sector. 
Despite the changes in labour law towards less 
regulation, particularly of employment contracts and 
dismissal protection, and a reduction in non-wage labour 
costs, there was no visible impact on job creation or on 
increased formalization. Rather, the most disturbing trend 
has been the increased share of non-protected waged 
workers in the 1990s (see table 6). In Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico, the share of non-protected employment 
increased by between 20% and 30%, irrespective of any 
changes (or lack of) in legal regulations and non-wage 
labour costs, and regardless of changes in the level of 
economic activity. This trend has been encouraged by 
government discourse about the need for flexibility 
combined with weakened labour inspection, particularly 
in Argentina and Mexico. 
2. Labour-market policies
An important and positive trend in labour-market 
governance in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico has been 
the increased prominence given to labour-market 
policies, both passive and active. Although programmes 
are still incipient, piecemeal and in need of additional 
and sustained funding, such policies have the potential 
to improve the operation of the labour market. By 
TABLE 6
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: proportion 
of non-protected workers in waged 
employment, 1991-2002a
(percentages)
Year Argentinab Brazilc Mexicod
 (1) (2) — (1) (2)
1991 23.2e … 27.9 33.8 20.3
1995 23.6 30.7f 33.2 39.3 24.9
1999 30.9 33.2 37.2 40.3 23.6
2002 29.1 33.2 37.9 40.8 23.9
Source: Marshall (2004).
a Data are not comparable across countries, as concepts and 
methodologies differ.
b Argentina: (1) wage earners (excluding household services and, 
in 2002, beneficiaries of employment programmes) without 
all social benefits (Buenos Aires-Cordoba-Rosario, Permanent 
Household Survey (EPH), National Institute of Statistics and 
Censuses (INDEC)); (2) wage earners (excluding household 
services and, in 2002, beneficiaries of employment programmes) 
with no social security contributions (urban areas, Permanent 
Household Survey (EPH), National Institute of Statistics and 
Censuses (INDEC)).
c Brazil: wage earners without employment contracts (carteira de 
trabalho), based on data from the Institute of Applied Economic 
Research (IPEA, 2003, statistical annex).
d Mexico: (1) wage earners without social benefits, National 
Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI), 
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providing security to workers in times of crises, these 
policies give employers the flexibility they need to 
operate in a global economy. Labour-market policies 
contribute concretely to alleviating the problems of 
the unemployed, whereas it is questionable whether 
“indirect incentives” (such as removing labour 
protection or reducing non-wage labour costs) result 
in more jobs. 
Labour-market policies comprise passive policies, 
which provide replacement income during periods of 
joblessness or job search, and active policies, which 
focus on labour-market integration either through 
demand or supply measures. The adverse labour-
market outcomes of the economic reforms, namely 
increased unemployment, informality and poverty, 
called for State intervention. Before the mid-1990s, 
labour-market policies in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico were sparse and sometimes existed only 
on paper. In the mid- and late 1990s, governments 
expanded and diversif ied programmes to respond 
to the continuous increase of unemployment and 
poverty within the region. The policies included a 
wide range of government interventions, including 
unemployment insurance programmes, employment-
creation programmes, self-employment and micro-
enterprise creation programmes, training programmes, 
and public employment services. 
In the early 1990s, labour-market policies in 
Argentina were fragmented and on a small scale, 
with little political and financial commitment on the 
part of the government. Labour-market policies were 
repeatedly used spuriously to benefit the political 
clientele, and often announced to avoid the emergence 
of conflict, or at electoral times, only to not be 
implemented or rapidly discontinued. Moreover, the 
fiscal restrictions in the convertibility programme 
did not support the funding of employment policies 
(Cortés and Marshall, 1999). This was particularly 
true of the unemployment insurance program, which 
was created in 1991, but had very limited coverage, 
so that when the crisis hit in 2002, only 8% of the 
unemployed benefited from the programme (Marshall, 
2004). It was only at the end of the 1990s that labour-
market policies were widened in the country, with the 
government committing political and financial support, 
as it saw them as an important instrument for providing 
income to the jobless and controlling social conflict. 
This was seen most explicitly with the 2002 creation of 
the Programme for Unemployed Heads of Household 
(Programa de Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados), 
which provides a monthly benefit (below the minimum 
wage) to unemployed persons with children, who in 
exchange must participate in training or community 
activities at least four hours daily. With over one 
million beneficiaries in 2004, government spending 
on labour-market policies has surpassed 1% of GDP, 
making it one of the highest in the region. Nevertheless, 
the programme has been criticized for being more of 
a social assistance programme than one that facilitates 
entry into the labour market, as some beneficiaries did 
not participate in the labour market prior to receiving 
benefits. As a result, the government has expanded its 
portfolio of labour-market policies to better address 
the varying profiles of the beneficiaries. 
In Brazil, although funding relative to GDP 
has also been of limited scale and coverage, there 
has been a longer-term, steadier effort at labour-
market intervention, through the implementation of 
unemployment insurance, intermediation and training 
schemes, and assistance to small-scale employers 
and self-employed workers.4 Brazil’s unemployment 
insurance fund, created in 1986 and later expanded, has 
the greatest scope and coverage of the six unemployment 
insurance programmes that exist in the region. It covers 
nearly 50% of the unemployed and is also particularly 
innovative in that the fund is also used to finance 
investment projects and union-administered training 
programmes (Inter-Union Department of Statistics and 
Socioeconomic Research (DIEESE), 2003).5
Labour-market policies have also been sparse 
in Mexico, but nevertheless have gained importance, 
both institutionally and financially. The programme 
for work-training grants, BECATE (previously the work 
training system (SICAT)), for example, was started after 
the 1982 crisis, providing training and a cash benefit 
to unemployed workers. It has expanded in scope and 
coverage and, by 2000, was benefiting half a million 
workers. Another important scheme is the temporary 
employment programme, run by the Secretariat of 
Social Development, which consists of labour-intensive 
public works projects in rural areas. From 660,000 
4 Besides labour-market policies, the Brazilian government has 
expanded its social assistance through school allowance (Bolsa 
Escola) and family allowance (Bolsa Familia) programmes. It has 
also extended and improved pension funds for the rural population, 
which has led to a reduction in poverty and an improvement in 
income distribution.
5 Formally employed Brazilian workers also have access to a 
severance fund (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço) financed 
through monthly contributions by the employer, which the worker 
has access to upon dismissal.
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We propose a set of economic and social policies to 
tackle the employment challenges of Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico. The policies demand a more proactive 
stance from the governments, which should intervene 
more forcefully in economic affairs than in the 1990s, 
as well as a proactive and constructive role for trade 
unions, employers’ organizations and civil society. The 
broad lines for a more balanced policy agenda to create 
decent work are the following:
1. Pursue employment targeting
If macroeconomic policy were driven by employment 
targets, then making employment the centre of 
economic policies would be an explicit policy goal. 
Employment targeting would be subject to an inflation 
constraint to ensure responsible policymaking, but by 
making employment creation the goal, the livelihoods 
of workers and society would be improved. Targets 
could be set depending on the specific needs of the 
country. Thus, it could be an unemployment rate target, 
an employment rate target—perhaps more appropriate 
because it encourages labour-force participation—or a 
target that considers formal employment rates or female 
employment rates.6 
Achieving an employment target would require 
that central banks expand their policy tools beyond the 
short-term interest rate. Depending on the mechanism 
that the central bank believes is the most effective 
way to generate employment, the portfolio of tools 
used would vary. For example, if ensuring a stable and 
competitive exchange rate was believed to be the best 
way to increase employment, then the central banks 
would need to be willing to control the money supply 
through the use of credit-allocation mechanisms such 
as quantitative credit controls, interest-rate ceilings 
and reserve requirements on bank deposits. The central 
bank could also take a more direct approach with 
credit allocation by setting quotas that banks and other 
financial institutions would have to achieve in lending 
for employment generation. Alternatively, the central 
bank could impose lower reserve requirements on 
loans for activities that would generate employment. 
Even more directly, the central bank could lend to 
a development bank that specializes in loans for 
employment-generating activities (Epstein, 2005). 
These policy tools could then be complemented with 
other government macroeconomic policies, in particular, 
ensuring that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical. 
beneficiaries in 1995, the programme had increased 
to over one million by 2000 (Samaniego, 2002). In 
Brazil, the government has also developed various 
micro-credit programmes to promote self-employment 
and micro-enterprise creation initiatives. 
Nevertheless, all three countries are still struggling 
to implement the training and work components 
of the active policies, as well as integrating the 
different programs into a cohesive system of labour-
market intermediation. This is particularly true of the 
Programme for Unemployed Heads of Household in 
Argentina, where the work and training requirements 
have often been bypassed, or have been of little 
productive value. Part of the problem, in all three 
countries, stems from the conflicting goals of the 
programmes, specifically, whether they are anti-poverty 
programmes or programmes to improve the functioning 
of the labour market. Anti-poverty programmes, which 
typically provide a benefit that is below the minimum 
wage, are successful in helping the poorest segments of 
the population but often face problems with programme 
delivery and implementation of the “active” components, 
i.e. helping people to carry out a productive activity 
while providing them with an income.
V
Policies for employment and decent work
6 For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, which 
has a mandate of ensuring price stability and full employment, sets 
interim targets of 4% unemployment and 3% inflation. In the past, 
many central banks had growth and employment creation as explicit 
goals (See Epstein, 2007). Although not a macroeconomic target, 
the European Union, in its European Employment Strategy, has set 
the following targets for 2010: a 70% overall employment rate and 
a 60% female employment rate.
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Developing a fiscal policy that is counter-cyclical 
requires policy initiatives such as restructuring debt 
so that it does not aggravate pro-cyclicality, as well as 
developing stabilization funds to smooth public spending 
across the economic cycle. Other possible options 
include indexing debt repayment to the growth of GDP 
or restructuring debt so that it is valued in national 
currency, but set at a fixed rate indexed to inflation. 
Stabilization funds have been established in the region, 
such as the structural fiscal rule applied in Chile, as well 
as the oil revenue fund in Mexico. The funds could be 
used to finance labour-market policies that would protect 
vulnerable groups during crises as well as improve 
economic performance, since the benefits they provide 
help to prop up consumption. Developing stabilization 
funds to smooth public spending across the economic 
cycle can also be instrumental in lessening volatility 
and improving macroeconomic performance.
2. Promote an export specialization in
 higher-value-added goods
While Argentina, Brazil and Mexico prof it from 
increased world demand for the primary and low-
processed goods that they produce, in the long term 
such a trade pattern has to be supplemented by the 
development of higher-value-added goods with a 
greater employment content. Though there have been 
some successes in producing higher-value-added goods, 
for example, in the automobile and aircraft industries, 
these countries have the potential to enhance their 
specialization, particularly of those products in which 
backward and forward linkages with domestic producers 
can be developed to create a multiplier effect on 
production and employment. An active industrial policy 
that facilitates the integration of domestic firms into 
the world market can help to improve the countries’ 
specialization. The government, in consultation with 
social partners, can play a beneficial role by supporting 
the creation of local research and development 
centres, education and training programs, as well as 
improving physical infrastructure (such as transport and 
communication) through public investment. In addition, 
firm clustering and third-generation maquiladoras 
should be further supported. Clusters such as the 
software industry in Blumenau, aeronautics in São Paolo 
and the agricultural mango-grape cluster in Petrolina 
(all in Brazil) and electronics in Jalisco (in Mexico) 
have succeeded in value-chain upgrading as well as 
in building backward and forward linkages in their 
regional area. These clusters are a successful, albeit 
limited, industrial development experience from which 
much can be learned. With regard to the maquiladora 
sector in Mexico, the development of promising third-
generation maquilas could be facilitated by public 
support; in particular, efforts could be made to link these 
maquilas with other sectors of the economy, through the 
promotion of joint ventures or strategic alliances with 
domestic suppliers.
3. Encourage productive investment
Foreign investment is an important source of financing 
for complementing scarce resources as well as for 
facilitating technology transfer and integration into the 
world market. However, not all foreign investment is 
helpful for economic and social progress; governments 
should therefore have a more proactive stance to 
influence inflows of “good” foreign investment. 
Governments can create rules or provide incentives to 
discourage speculative, rent-seeking investment and 
encourage foreign investors to work with domestic 
firms, both large and small, to promote value-chain 
upgrading and to invest in human-capital development. 
Additionally, governments should try to stimulate 
domestic investment through measures that increase 
the liquidity of the domestic financial market as well 
as through specific support for micro and small and 
medium-sized enterprises, as these firms are important 
employers in all three countries. Greater domestic 
investment will strengthen internal demand with 
important concomitant employment effects. Moreover, 
striking a more even balance between foreign and 
domestic investment —as envisaged by Argentina and 
Brazil— would reduce external vulnerability and thus 
improve the business climate and the macroeconomic 
environment.
4. Promote efficiency in labour-market 
institutions and expand the use of labour-
market policies
Since 1990, all three countries have seen an increase 
in the proportion of non-protected workers in waged 
employment, a problem that is particularly widespread 
among micro and small firms. The countries should 
improve labour inspection as this is a highly effective 
tool for regularizing work conditions. In Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, there are too few labour inspectors 
and, as a result, enforcement is weak. Another issue 
concerns the development of regulations and policies 
that give firms the flexibility they need to compete 
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Though there are many different policy variables 
that affect employment creation, we believe that it is 
the combination of policies at the macro, meso and 
micro level that can facilitate the creation of decent 
work.7 However, the successful implementation of 
these policies requires a more proactive role of the 
main stakeholders in society: government at all levels, 
employers’ and workers’ organizations and civil society. 
As both employers and workers must confront the 
challenges of globalization, it is important that their 
views are represented. Previously, governments formed 
corporatist alliances with social partners, but with the 
dismantling of import-substitution industrialization, 
workers’ and employers’ organizations have become 
more autonomous. This independence requires 
coordination among government and social partners 
through continuous dialogue (beyond bargaining 
rounds), as well as greater responsibility from all 
parties to shape economic and social issues. Policy 
formulation would also benefit from including new 
social actors representing informal workers and the 
unemployed, particularly concerning the development 
of labour-market policies as well as policies aimed 
at formalizing informal workers. However, for social 
dialogue to be sustained and effective, it must be 
institutionalized through, for example, social and 
economic councils and obligatory consultation with 
social partners. 
These recommendations do not imply a return 
to State planning of economic activity, but rather 
the creation and strengthening of institutions to 
frame market forces and repair market failures, 
in the global economy, without jeopardizing workers’ 
security. For example, it seems better for labour-market 
functioning to finance income replacement in the 
event of job loss via an unemployment insurance fund 
financed by employers, workers and the State, rather 
than relying only on individual, firm-based severance 
pay systems, which place a large financial burden on 
firms exactly at the moment when they are suffering 
from recession and lack of liquidity.
Labour-market policies, both passive and active, 
are important for helping individual workers cope 
with economic shocks as they improve labour-market 
integration, as well as providing income support to 
displaced workers in need. Although Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico have begun to recognize the benefits 
of labour-market policies, the level of spending and 
coverage of these policies remains limited, with Brazil 
and Mexico dedicating less than 1% of GDP to labour-
market policies, and Argentina spending just 1%. The 
countries would therefore benefit by discussing with 
the social partners how to expand their labour-market 
policies to make them a permanent tool that has 
the flexibility to respond to the countries’ needs. In 
particular, the countries would benefit from adopting 
(Mexico) or expanding (particularly Argentina, but also 
Brazil) unemployment insurance and by developing a 
greater and more permanent portfolio of active labour-
market policies to facilitate the labour-market integration 
of both informal- and formal-sector workers.
Labour-market policies should not be considered 
a short-term solution in response to the latest crisis, 
but should be a permanent feature of economic policy, 
as business-cycle fluctuations and partial-adjustment 
shocks are recurrent. In a framework of flexibility and 
security for the labour market, the right sequencing 
of policies might help to improve labour-market 
functioning. Especially in the low-trust environment 
created by a decade of failed reforms, where each 
attempt to touch upon vested worker’s rights is seen 
as an attack on their livelihood, it might be advisable 
to first introduce the security component (such as 
an unemployment benefit system coordinated with 
active labour-market policies) before reforming those 
elements of employment protection that possibly impede 
adjustment to structural change.
VI
Conclusion
7 In this regard, the newly reassessed Global Employment Agenda 
(GEA) of the International Labour Organization (ILO) is a helpful 
strategic tool for enhancing employment growth. It proposes a 
comprehensive employment strategy that includes, in addition to the 
points above, enterprise creation and skills policies (ILO 2006).
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while attempting to prevent policy failures. Making 
employment central to economic and social policies 
implies a direct route to more jobs, instead of detours 
via an exclusive focus on macroeconomic stabilization 
and economic opening with its uncertain effects on 
employment.
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